The Effects of Labour Market Reforms upon Unemployment and Income Inequalities: an Agent Based Model

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The Effects of Labour Market Reforms upon Unemployment and Income Inequalities: an Agent Based Model

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Abstract

This paper is meant to analyse the effects of labour market structural reforms by means of an agent-based model. Building on Dosi et al. (2016b) we introduce a policy regime change characterized by a set of structural reforms on the labour market, keeping constant the structure of the capital- and consumption-good markets. Confirming a recent IMF report (Jaumotte and Buitron, 2015), the model shows how labour market structural reforms reducing workers’ bargaining power and compressing wages tend to increase (i) unemployment, (ii) functional income inequality, and (iii) personal income inequality. We further undertake a global sensitivity analysis on key variables and parameters which confirms the robustness of our findings.

Keywords

Labour Market Structural Reforms, Income Distribution, Inequality, Unemployment, Long-Run Growth.

JEL codes

C63, E02, E12, E24, O11

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1 Introduction

In this paper we develop an agent-based model to study the short- and long-run impact of structural reforms aimed at increasing the flexibility of the labour market.

During the years of the recent European crisis (and also before), the economic policy debate has been marked by the emphasis on the need of labour market structural reforms. This rhetoric has addressed particularly the Mediterranean countries, praising all “recipes” aimed at labour market flexibilization as key to increase productivity and GDP growth, ultimately leading to measures such as the Jobs Act in Italy and the reform of the Code du Travail in France.

The call for such reforms finds support in the “consensus” among several scholars on the idea that labour market rigidities are the source of the observed unemployment. The well-known OECD (1994) Jobs Study has been a landmark in the advocacy of the benefits from labour market liberalization. The report and a series of subsequent papers (including Scarpetta, 1996, Siebert, 1997, Belot and Van Ours, 2004, Bassanini and Duval, 2006) argued that the roots of unemployment rest in social institutions and policies such as unions, unemployment benefits, and employment protection legislation. Under this perspective, the ultimate target for reforms should be fostering productivity and the output growth by tackling such bottlenecks. More precisely, a “Jobs Strategy” was proposed with ten recommendations, wherein three of them were explicitly directed at making wage and labour cost more flexible: (i) removing restrictions that prevent wages to be respondent to local conditions; (ii) reform the employment protection legislation (EPL), abolishing legal provisions that can inhibit the private sector’s employment dynamics; and (iii) reform the Social Security benefits such that equity goals can be reached without impinging the efficient functioning of labour markets (OECD, 1994).

These policy recommendations were the results of a so called “Unified Theory” or “Transatlantic Consensus”, also known as the “OECD-IMF orthodoxy” (Howell, 2005) according to which labour market institutions such as collective bargaining, legal minimum wages, employment protection laws and unemployment benefits foster rigidities that make job creation less attractive for employers and joblessness more attractive for workers. Why? Two alternative reasons are proposed: (i) institutions may increase unemployment preventing downward wage flexibility (the wage compression variant), or (ii) institutions may alter the competitive nexus between earning and skills distributions, artificially increasing wages for the lower tail of the workers’ skills distribution (the skill dispersion variant).

The empirical counterpart of the first variant should be a negative relationship between earnings inequality and unemployment: whenever labour market institutions chose equity (lower degree of inequality) with respect to efficiency (lower level of unemployment) this would induce a higher portion of unemployed people. Conversely, in the second interpretation, the skill dispersion variant, the inequality-unemployment trade-off is not necessarily expected because more or less equality/inequality in the wage distribution is not due to institutional factors but to supply and demand conditions (particularly to the technology-induced demand of highly-skilled workers). In this latter case, unemployment arises not because of the absence of downward wage flexibility but due to the fact that the skill levels of poorly-educated workers do not match with those required by the incumbent technologies, the so called skill-biased technical change hypothesis. Thus, active labour market policies are advocated to upgrade worker skills.

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1 Recently rephrased as “Berlin-Washington Consensus” in Fitoussi and Saraceno (2013).
2 See Autor et al., 2008 among a vast literature.
It happens that both theories present very little empirical support: Howell and Huebler (2005) find little evidence of the unemployment-inequality tradeoff both in level and growth variables for 16 OECD countries in the period 1980-1995. On the contrary, Stiglitz (2012, 2015) suggests that high income inequality induces a lack of aggregate demand which yields higher unemployment rates, having rich people a lower propensity to consume in line with the whole Keynesian/Kaldorian tradition. Heathcote et al., 2010 find evidence that during recessionary phases low-income workers are more severely hit by layoffs, implying that income concentration diverts toward upper classes in these periods. Maestri and Roventini (2012) confirm a positive cross correlation between inequality and unemployment in Canada, Sweden, and the United States.

If the wage compression story does not show a good empirical record, what about the skill dispersion story? Howell and Huebler (2005) do not find evidence of increasing inequalities in countries characterized by rapid diffusion of new technologies (like Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, and Sweden) which, conversely, show a stable pattern of earning inequalities in the period 1979-1998. On the other hand, focusing on the US, DiNardo et al. (1996) and Fortin and Lemieux (1997) do find robust empirical support to the fact that de-unionization (for men) and stagnant minimum wage (for women) have been the institutional determinants at the core of the increasing inequality trend in the US. Strengthening the latter results, Devroye and Freeman (2001) find that skill dispersion explains only 7% of the cross-country differences in inequality. Moreover, in narrowly-defined skill groups, earning dispersion is higher in the US than in European countries. Similar findings are in Freeman and Schettkat (2001) for a US-Germany comparison.

We fully share with Rodrik (2016) the acknowledgement of the partial amnesia of the orthodox consensus on the benefit of structural reforms:

Oddly, though, debate over the reforms pressed on Greece and other crisis-battered countries on the periphery of Europe did not benefit from lessons learned in these other settings. A serious look at the vast experience with privatization, deregulation and liberalization since the 1980 – in Latin America, post-socialist economies and Asia in particular – would have produced much less optimism about the benefits of the kinds of reforms Athens was asked to impose. [p. 28]

Indeed, the amnesia is more than partial. Let us briefly summarize some empirical evidence that carefully debunks the link between protective (or commonly defined “rigid”) labour market institutions (PLMI) and rising unemployment, on the one hand, and the effect of the change of the institutional structure on inequality, on the other hand.

Howell et al. (2007), reviewing the empirical results on the effects of protective labour market policies on unemployment, argue that the evaluation of the effects of PLMI has been biased by a number of factors: (i) the findings were largely theory-driven, discarding a good deal of the empirical evidence; (ii) the explanatory power of labour market institutions as sources of unemployment appears to decline with the quality of the PLMI indicators and the sophistication of the econometric methodology applied; (iii) the inclination to violate the principles against endogeneity, phrasing simple cross-correlations as evidence of causation; and (iv) the remarkable differences in the magnitude of regression coefficients, statistical significance, and estimation methodology across the works.

Due to the blossoming evidence of empirical results which markedly question the “recipe” of labour market structural reforms, in the last decade the OECD retreated from some of the questionable claims proposed in the Jobs Strategy, acknowledging that the evidence on the effect of EPL is not conclusive, the emergence of temporary contracts can have undesirable effects like duality in the job market, and that the effect of unionization should be more carefully analysed (see Freeman, 2005). However, notwithstanding the lack of any compelling evidence on the ability of labour market structural reforms to reduce unemployment, the mantra on the magic of flexibilization continue to linger around.

Nonetheless, while some consensus is emerging in the acknowledgement that transformations in labour market institutions are potential drivers of inequality for low- and medium-income workers, they have been poorly investigated as a source of functional inequality (among wage and capital income earners). In fact, Piketty and Saez (2006) and Atkinson et al. (2011) envisaged in the “financialization” process and the lack of progressive taxation two main causes of the top 1% earnings rising. Less attention has been devoted to the the process of de-unionization. In a Discussion Note of the IMF, Dabla-Norris et al. (2015) have recently emphasized the growing concern on the increasing inequality at the global level. Another recent IMF report (Jaumotte and Buitron, 2015) focuses, among all possible causes of inequality, on the institutional changes that occurred in the labour market as a driver of spurring unequal income distribution. Interestingly, the authors find in the transformation of labour market institutions the source of both functional and personal inequalities. The evidence on a strong negative relationship between unionization and top earners’ income share of course militates against the widely held belief that unionization leads to insider vs outsider duality.3

Notably, since the early eighties a large ensemble of empirical analyses on longitudinal microdata has been finding that unions are able to mitigate wage inequality across workers (see Freeman, 1980 for the US, Hibbs Jr and Locking, 2000 for Sweden, Manacorda, 2004 for Italy, Dahl et al., 2013 for Denmark). The novelty of the result in Jaumotte and Buitron (2015) is that de-unionization is accounted responsible also for the increase of the functional inequality. There are two proposed channels through which de-unionization works, namely, first, in the presence of weaker unions the share of capital on net output tends to increase, and, second, lower union density decreases workers collective bargaining power hence their influence on corporate decisions. A latere, minimum wage is, conversely, able to mitigate overall inequality by having large effects on low and medium income workers. In fact, Kristal and Cohen (2016) recently find out that the decline of unionization and of the real minimum wage are responsible for 50 – 60% of the increase in the US wage inequality for the period 1969-2012.

Why is inequality so relevant in the policy debate? Are not more unequal economic systems better able to foster investment and growth, as many have proposed for a while? In another IMF report, Berg and Ostry (2011) analyse the relationship between sustained growth and inequality. The point here is not just growth but sustained growth: many Latin American countries have

3See Lindbeck and Snower, 2001 among many others.
experienced at least one phase of spurring economic growth for a few years, but the issue is how to maintain it. The authors find robust evidence that longer growth spells are associated with more egalitarian income distribution. More recently, Ostry et al. (2014) highlight that there is no actual trade-off between equity and efficiency: measuring the Gini coefficient before and after taxes and transfers,\(^4\) they find that inequality reduction does not hold growth, on the contrary, it positively affects the duration of growth phases.

The foregoing evidence does suggest that institutions are quite important for equity considerations, particularly for the process of wage formation, mitigating inequality, but are not responsible for the lack of employment (the efficiency outcomes). However, if this is the case, the introduction of labour market structural reforms – aimed at altering the wage formation mechanisms and lowering unionization, unemployment benefits and minimum wages – are likely to yield both higher inequality and structural unemployment without fostering productivity or GDP growth. The emergence of increased income inequality (personal and functional) and higher unemployment as the product of labour market structural reforms\(^5\) is, indeed, what we are going to study in this work by means of an agent-based model (ABM) of the labour market.

The model builds on Dosi et al. (2016b)\(^6\) and introduces a policy regime change along the simulated history in order to analyse the effects of structural reforms. Our results, grounded on a model able to reproduce a large ensemble of micro and macro empirical regularities, suggest that the introduction of the recommended “flexible” labour market institutions tend to: (i) increase unemployment; (ii) increase inequality in functional income distribution; and (iii) increase inequality in personal income distribution. Moreover, the inception of structural reforms worsens the macroeconomic performance.

Finally, we test the robustness of our model by means of in-depth global sensitivity analysis (SA), by means of a Kriging meta-model of the original ABM (Dosi et al., 2016c; Salle and Yildizoglu, 2014), on a set of key output variables, namely unemployment, Gini coefficient, functional income distribution (mark-up), and productivity growth. The SA sheds light on the role of the relevant parameters on how they affect (or not) the foregoing metrics. It confirms that when labour market structural reforms are introduced: (i) the profit share increases, (ii) unemployment subsidies tend to mitigate the observed worsening of the Gini coefficient, and (iii) the parameters relevant for productivity dynamics are not the same that drive the labour market.

We proceed as follows. In Section 2 we present the basic structure of the model, while in Section 3, the policy experiments. Section 4 discusses the sensitivity analysis and the policy implications. Finally, Section 5 concludes.

\(^4\)To measure the benefits from redistributive policies one should distinguish between pre- and post-transfers inequality (net inequality).

\(^5\)In this paper we do not address the complementarity between product and labour markets structural reforms and, thus, fall short of any characterization of archetypes of capitalism able to cover both dimensions. See Amable (2009) for an exhaustive discussion of the institutional complementarity and the interrelations between labour and product market structural reform.

\(^6\)Also known as the Keynes Meets Schumpeter (K+S) family of models (Dosi et al., 2013, 2010; Dosi et al., 2015) which belongs to the broader family of Agent-Based evolutionary models (cf. Tesfatsion and Judd, 2006, LeBaron and Tesfatsion, 2008, Nelson and Winter, 1982). For related ABM’s considering decentralized labour markets and their impact on the macroeconomic conditions see Fagiolo et al. (2004), Dawid et al. (2008), Deissenberg et al. (2008), Seppecher (2012), David et al. (2012, 2014), Riccetti et al. (2014) and Russo et al. (2015), and Caiani et al. (2015, 2016). See Neugart and Richiardi (2012), Fagiolo and Roventini (2012, 2016) for critical surveys on labour market and macro ABM’s, respectively.
2 The model

We build a general disequilibrium agent-based model, populated by heterogeneous firms and workers, who behave according to boundedly rational behavioural rules. More specifically, we extend the Keynes Meets Schumpeter (K+S) model (Dosi et al., 2010) to account for explicit, decentralized interactions among firms and workers in the labour market.

The two-sector economy is composed of three populations of heterogeneous agents, $N_1$ capital-good firms (denoted by the subscript $i$), $N_2$ consumption-good firms (denoted by the subscript $j$), $L^S$ consumers/workers (denoted by the subscript $\ell$), plus a bank and the Government. The basic structure of the model is depicted in Figure 1. Capital-good firms invest in R&D and produce heterogeneous machine-tools whose productivity stochastically evolves over time. Consumption-good firms combine machines bought from capital-good firms and labour in order to produce an homogeneous product for consumers. There is a minimal financial system represented by a single bank that provides credit to firms to finance production and investment plans. Workers submit job applications to a random subset of firms, with probability proportional to the size of the latter. Firms hire according to their individual adaptive demand expectations. The government levies taxes on firms and pays unemployment benefits, according to the policy setting, keeping a relatively balanced budget in the long run.

In the following, we first describe the capital- and the consumption-good sectors of our economy and then the labour market configuration and dynamics. Next, we present the two alternative labour-market policy regime settings (and variations thereof), labelled Fordist and Competitive (see Section 2.2). The two regimes entail distinct, explicitly microfounded labour markets distinguished by some key aspects, like the job search activity, the firing rules adopted by firms, the mechanism of wage determination and the labour market institutions. Finally, the aggregate consumption determination and the Government role are detailed. In Appendix A, we formally describe firms’ behavioural rules and the innovation processes (see also Dosi et al.,...
The labour market variables and parameters set-up are further detailed in Appendix B (cf. Tables 5 and 6).

2.1 The capital- and consumption-good sectors

The capital-good industry is the locus where innovation is endogenously generated in the economy. Capital-good firms develop new machine-embodied techniques or imitate the ones of their competitors in order to produce and sell more productive and cheaper machinery, supplied on order to consumption-good firms. The capital-good market is characterized by imperfect information and Schumpeterian competition driven by technological innovation. Machine-tool firms signal the price and productivity of their machines to their existing customers as well as a subset of potential new ones and invest a fraction of past revenues in R&D in order to search for new machines or copy existing ones. On order, they produce machine-tools with labour only. Prices are set using a fixed mark-up over unit (labour) costs of production.

Consumption-good firms produce an homogeneous good employing capital (composed by different “vintages” of machines) and labour under constant returns to scale. Desired production is determined according to adaptive demand expectations. Given the actual inventories, if the capital stock is not sufficient to produce the desired output, firms order new machines in order to expand their installed capacity, paying in advance – drawing on their cash flows or, up to a limit proportional to its size, on bank credit. Moreover, they replace old machines according to a payback-period rule. As new machines embed state-of-the-art technologies, the labour productivity of consumption-good firms increases over time according to the mix of vintages of machines present in their capital stocks. Consumption-good firms choose in every period their capital-good supplier comparing the price and the productivity of the machines they are aware of. Firms then fix their prices applying a variable mark-up rule on their production costs, trying to balance higher profits and the growth of market share. More specifically, mark-up dynamics is driven by the evolution of the latter: firms increase their price whenever their market share is expanding and vice versa. Imperfect information is also the normal state of the consumption-good market so consumers do not instantaneously switch to the most competitive producer. Market shares evolve according to a (quasi) replicator dynamics: more competitive firms expand while firms with relatively lower competitiveness levels shrink, or exit the market.

2.2 Labour market regimes

We study two labour market regimes, which we call Fordist and Competitive. They are telegraphically sketched in Table 1. Under the Fordist regime, wages are insensitive to the labour market conditions and indexed to the productivity gains of the firms. There is a sort of covenant between firms and workers concerning “long term” employment: firms fire only when their profits get negative, while workers are loyal to employers and do not seek for alternative occupations. Labour market institutions contemplate a minimum wage fully indexed to aggregated economy productivity and unemployment benefits financed by taxes on profits. Conversely, in the Competitive regime, flexible wages respond to unemployment and market conditions, set by means of an asymmetric bargaining process where firms have the last say. Employed workers search for better paid jobs with some positive probability and firms freely adjust (fire) their excess

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7The two regimes capture alternative wage-labour nexus in the words of the Regulation Theory (see, within a vast literature, Boyer and Saillard, 2005 and Amable, 2003 for a refined taxonomy).
workforce according to their planned production. The competitive regime is also characterized by different labour institutions: minimum wage is only partially indexed to productivity and unemployment benefits – and associated taxes on profits – might or might not be there.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Fordist</th>
<th>Competitive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wage sensitivity to unemployment</td>
<td>rigid</td>
<td>flexible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search intensity</td>
<td>unemployed only</td>
<td>unemployed and employed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firing rule</td>
<td>under losses only</td>
<td>shrinkage on production only temporary contracts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment benefits / tax on profits</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no or reduced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum wage productivity indexation</td>
<td>full</td>
<td>partial</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: The two archetypal labour regimes main characteristics configured in the model.

2.2.1 Matching and hiring

The aggregate supply of labour $L^S$ is fixed. In the consumption-good sector, total desired labour demand $L^d_{j,t}$, by any firm $j$ in period $t$ is determined by the ratio between the desired production $Q^d_{j,t}$ and the average productivity of its current capital stock $A_{j,t}$:

$$L^d_{j,t} = \frac{Q^d_{j,t}}{A_{j,t}}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (1)

A similar process is performed by firms $i$ in the capital-good sector to define $L^d_{i,t}$ but considering effective orders $Q^i_{t,t}$ and labour productivity on current technology $B_{i,t}$.

In turn, desired consumption-good production is based on expected demand $D^c_{j,t}$, computed by a simple adaptive rule:

$$D^c_{j,t} = g(D_{j,t-1}, D_{j,t-2}, D_{j,t-h}), \quad 0 < h < t$$ \hspace{1cm} (2)

where $D_{j,t-h}$ is the demand actually faced by firm $j$ at time $t - h$ ($h \in \mathbb{N}^*$ is a parameter and $g : \mathbb{R}^h \to \mathbb{R}^+$ is the expectation function). The desired level of production $Q^d_{j,t}$ depends also on the desired inventories $N^d_{j,t}$ and the actual inventories left from previous period $N_{j,t-1}$:

$$Q^d_{j,t} = D^c_{j,t} + N^d_{j,t} - N_{j,t-1}.$$ \hspace{1cm} (3)

In each period, according to the dynamics of the market and conditional on the labour market regime, firms decide whether to hire (or fire) workers. The decision is taken according to the expected production $Q^d_{j,t}$. In case of an increase in production, $\Delta L^d_{j,t}$, new workers are (tentatively) hired in addition to the existing labour force $L_{j,t-1}$:

$$\text{if } \Delta Q^d_{j,t} = Q^d_{j,t} - Q_{j,t-1} > 0 \Rightarrow \text{ hire } \Delta L^d_{j,t} = L^d_{j,t} - L_{j,t-1} \text{ workers.}$$  \hspace{1cm} (4)

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8In what follows, we represent only the behaviour of consumption-good firms (indicated by the subscript $j$) in the labour market, given most workers are hired in this sector. However, capital-good firms operate under the same rules except they (i) follow the wage offers from top-paying firms in the consumption-good sector and (ii) present their job offers to workers before consumption-sector companies.

9The exact type of adaptive expectation rule does not significantly affect the performance of the firms and of the system as a whole. If anything, more sophisticated ones might worsen measures of performance, see Dosi et al. (2006) and Dosi et al. (2016a).
More precisely, under the redundancy rules of the Competitive regime any change in the desired production usually entails a (positive or negative) variation in the firm-level labour demand. Not so under the Fordist regime, wherein labour “hoarding” (during the “good” times) is the rule.

Each firm $j$ (expectedly) get, in probability, a fraction of the number of applicant workers $\omega L_a$ in its candidates queue, proportional to firm market share $f_{j,t-1}$:

$$E(L^s_{j,t}) = \omega L_a f_{j,t-1}$$

where $\omega L_a \in \mathbb{R}^+$ is a scaling parameter defining the number of job queues each seeker is allowed to join and $E(L^s_{j,t})$ is the expected number of workers in the queue of firm $j$ in period $t$. When workers can apply to more than one firm at a time, firms may not be able to hire all workers in their queue, even when they mean to. Considering the set of workers in the candidates queue $\{\ell^s_{j,t}\}$, each firm has to select to whom to make a job (wage) offer. The set of desired workers $\{\ell^d_{j,t}\}$, among those in the queue $\{\ell^s_{j,t}\}$, is defined as:

$$\{\ell^d_{j,t}\} = \{\ell_{j,t} \in \{\ell^s_{j,t}\} : w^r_{j,t} < w^o_{j,t}\}, \quad \{\ell^d_{j,t}\} \subseteq \{\ell^s_{j,t}\}$$

that is, the firm targets workers that would accept its wage offer $w^o_{j,t}$, considering the wage $w^r_{j,t}$ requested (if any). Given that each firm hires a number of workers up to its own demand $\Delta L^d_{j,t}$ or to all workers in its queue, the number of effectively hired workers (the set $\{\ell^h_{j,t}\}$) is:

$$\#\{\ell^h_{j,t}\} = \Delta L_{j,t} \leq \Delta L^d_{j,t} \leq L^s_{j,t} = \#\{\ell^s_{j,t}\}, \quad \Delta L_{j,t} = L_{j,t} - L_{j,t-1}.$$  \hfill (7)

### 2.2.2 Search, wage determination and firing

The search, wage determination and firing processes differ between the two regimes.

**The baseline: Fordist regime**

As mentioned, in the Fordist regime, the implicit pact among firms and workers implies that the latter never voluntarily quit their job, while firms fire employees only when experiencing negative profits $\Pi_{j,t-1}$ and shrinking production $\Delta Q^d_{j,t}$:

$$\Pi_{j,t-1} < 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \Delta Q^d_{j,t} < 0 \Rightarrow \Delta L^d_{j,t} < 0$$ \hfill (8)

Also, only unemployed workers search for jobs.

Wages are not bargained. Firm $j$ unilaterally offer a wage $w^o_{j,t}$ according to:

$$w^o_{j,t} = w^o_{j,t-1}[1 + \max(0, WP_{j,t})].$$ \hfill (9)

The wage premium $WP_{j,t}$ is is defined as:

$$WP_{j,t} = \psi_1 \frac{\Delta A_t}{A_{t-1}} + \psi_2 \frac{\Delta A_{j,t}}{A_{j,t-1}}, \quad \psi_1 + \psi_2 \leq 1$$ \hfill (10)

being $A_t$ the aggregate labour productivity, $A_{j,t}$ the firm $j$ specific productivity, $\Delta$ the time difference operator, and $\psi_1, \psi_2 \in [0, 1]$ parameters. A distinctive feature of this regime is that gains in labour productivity and hence, indirectly, the benefit from innovative activities are

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10 Of course, firms exiting the market always fire all their workers.
passed to workers via wage increases. Moreover, wages are not only linked to firm specific performance but also to the aggregate productivity dynamics of the economy. Finally, note that $w_{j,t}^{0}$ is simultaneously applied to existing workers of firm $j$, so there is no intra-firm differential in wages. Indeed, the Fordist regime describes a wage-labour nexus where worker purchasing power is linked with productivity gains of firms: the sum $\psi_1 + \psi_2$ acts as an institutional parameter which establishes the division of productivity gains between firms and workers. Under the Fordist regime it is set to 1. The Fordist wage determination process induces a twofold virtuous cycle: one which goes from productivity to wages to aggregate demand and the other from investments to profits.\(^{11}\)

**The introduction of structural reforms: Competitive regime**

The introduction of structural reforms to spur flexibility in the labour market implies that the social compromise embodied in the Fordist Regime is totally or partially removed. In the new Competitive setting, wage determination is flexible to labour market conditions, firms freely hire and fire in each period, and employees can actively search for better jobs all the time (employment-to-employment movement is allowed).

Workers have a (institutionally determined) reservation wage equal to the unemployment benefit $w^u_l$ they would receive in case of unemployment, if any. The wage $w^r_{l,t}$ requested by worker $l$ is a function of the individual unemployment conditions and the past wages history. If the worker was unemployed in the previous period, his request $w^r_{l,t}$ shrinks because of the reduced bargaining power. More specifically, she will request the maximum between the unemployment benefits (if available) and its own satisfying wage $w^s_{l,t}$, accounting for the recent worker-wage history:

\[
\begin{align*}
  w^r_{l,t} &= \begin{cases} 
    \max(w^u_l, w^s_{l,t}) & \text{if } l \text{ is unemployed in } t-1 \\
    w^s_{l,t-1}(1 + \epsilon) & \text{if } l \text{ is employed in } t-1 
  \end{cases} 
\end{align*}
\]

being $\epsilon \in \mathbb{R}^+$ a parameter. The satisfying wage is defined as:

\[
  w^s_{l,t} = \frac{1}{T_s} \sum_{h=1}^{T_s} w_{l,t-h}
\]

that is, the moving average salary of the last $T_s \in \mathbb{N}^*$ periods, a parameter.

After having received job applications and computed the required number of workers $\Delta L^d_{j,t}$ to hire for the period, the wage offered by each firm $j$ is adjusted the minimum amount that satisfies enough workers in its queue $\{l^s_{j,t}\}$. Therefore, it is the highest wage among the smallest set of the cheapest (available) workers in the queue:

\[
  w^o_{j,t} = \max w^r_{l,t}, \quad l \in \{l^s_{j,t}\} \quad \text{and} \quad \#\{l^h_{j,t}\} \leq \Delta L^d_{j,t}
\]

where $\{l^h_{j,t}\}$ is the set of hired workers.

\(^{11}\)Of course, wages are not unbounded, as each firm $j$ can afford to pay a salary $w^o_{j,t}$ up to a maximum break-even wage $w^{max}_{j,t}$ that is the wage compatible with zero unit profits. This wage is defined as the product between (myopically) expected prices $p_{j,t-1}$ times productivity $A_{j,t-1}$:

\[
  w^o_{j,t} \leq w^{max}_{j,t}, \quad w^{max}_{j,t} = p_{j,t-1}A_{j,t-1}
\]
Workers in each period search for better-paid jobs. If a worker gets an offer from firm \( n \), she decides whether quitting or not the current employer \( j \), according to the rule

\[
\text{quit if } w_{n \neq j,t}^o \geq w_{\ell,t}^r
\]

that is, worker \( \ell \) quits firm \( j \) if she receives a wage offer \( w_{n \neq j,t}^o \) from at least one firm \( n \) that is equal or higher than its required wage \( w_{\ell,t}^r \).

Firing occurs according to alternative rules that characterize three Competitive regime scenarios:

1. **Competitive 1**: Firms fire whenever temporary work contracts end.
   
   Firm \( j \) fires whenever the fixed-period \( (T_c \in \mathbb{N}^*) \), a parameter) work contract of each worker \( l \) expires. This rule captures a pattern of pure temporary employment arrangements.

2. **Competitive 2**: Firms fire whenever production shrinks.
   
   Whenever firm \( j \) desires a shrinkage \( \Delta Q_{j,t}^d \) of its production, irrespective to its real profitability or to the medium- and long-term business perspectives, it fires the unneeded workers.

3. **Competitive 3**: Firms adopt increasing-protection work contracts.
   
   For the first \( T_p \in \mathbb{N}^* \) periods (a parameter) in the job, workers can be freely fired by the firm. After that, they can be dismissed only in case of shrinkage of production. This firing rule represents an increasing protection policy according to which, after some time in the job, workers get some unemployment protection.

### 2.3 Model closure: the Government and consumption determination

In the model, a highly stylized Government taxes firm profits at the fixed rate \( \text{aliq} \in \mathbb{R}^+ \), and provides a benefit \( w_u^t \) to unemployed workers which is a fraction of the current average wage:

\[
w_u^t = \psi \frac{1}{L_{D,t-1}^D} \sum_{\ell=1}^{L_{D,t-1}^D} w_{\ell,t-1}, \quad \psi \in [0,1]
\]

where \( \psi \) is a parameter and \( L_{D,t}^D \), the total labour demand in period \( t \). Therefore, the Government total expenses are:

\[
G_t = w_u^t (L^S - L_{t}^D).
\]

We assume workers fully consume their income.\(^{12}\) Accordingly, desired aggregate consumption \( C_{t}^{d} \) depends on the income of both employed and unemployed workers plus the desired unsatisfied consumption from the previous period (the \( C_{t-1}^{d} - C_{t-1} \) term):

\[
C_{t}^{d} = \sum_{\ell} w_{\ell,t-1} + G_t + (C_{t-1}^{d} - C_{t-1})
\]

\[
C_t = \min(C_{t-1}^{d}, Q_t^2), \quad Q_t^2 = \sum_j Q_{j,t}
\]

\(^{12}\)This is equivalent to assume that workers are credit constrained and therefore cannot engage in standard consumption smoothing. Notice that the conclusions of the paper qualitatively hold as long as, in good Keynesian tradition (e.g., Kaldor, 1955), the propensity to consume out of profits is lower than that out of wages.
being $C_t$ the effective demand that is bound by the real production $Q_t^2$ of firms in the consumption-good sector. Finally, the Government establishes an institutional minimum wage $w_t^{min}$ which imposes a lower bound to the firm-specific wage setting behaviour:

$$w_t^{min} = w_{t-1}^{min} \left( 1 + \psi_1 \frac{A_t}{A_{t-1}} \right).$$  \hspace{1cm} (20)

The dynamics generated at the micro level by the decisions and interactions of a multiplicity of heterogeneous adaptive agents is the explicit microfoundation for all aggregate variables of interest (e.g., output, investment, employment). The model satisfies the standard national account identities: the sum of value added of capital- and consumption-good firms $Y_t$ equals their aggregated production $Q_t^1 + Q_t^2$ (in our simplified economy there are no intermediate goods). Total production, in turn, coincides with the sum of aggregate effective consumption $C_t$, investment $I_t$ and change in inventories $\Delta N_t$:

$$\sum_i Q_{i,t} + \sum_j Q_{j,t} = Q_t^1 + Q_t^2 = Y_t = C_t + I_t + \Delta N_t.$$ \hspace{1cm} (21)

### 2.4 Timeline of events

In each time step, firms and workers take their decision according to the following timeline:

1. Capital-good firms perform R&D and signal their machines to consumption-good firms.
2. Consumption-good firms decide on how much to produce, invest and hire/fire.
3. To fulfill their production and investment plans, firms allocate their cash-flows and (if needed) borrow from bank.
4. Firms send/receive machine-tool orders and open job queues.
5. Job-seekers send applications to firms ("queue").
6. Wages are set (by indexation or bargaining) and job vacancies are partly or totally filled.
8. Consumption-good market opens and the market shares of firms evolve according to price competitiveness.
9. Firms in both sectors compute their profits, pay wages, repay debt and distribute dividends.
10. Entry and exit take places, firms with near zero market share or negative net liquid assets are eschewed from the market and replaced by new ones.
11. Machines are delivered and become part of the capital stock at time $t + 1$.
12. Aggregate variables are computed and the cycle restarts.
3 Policy experiment results

We will employ the foregoing extension of the K+S model to study the effects of the introduction of structural reforms in the Fordist regime. More specifically, we will analyse the effects of the transition to three alternative scenarios of the Competitive regime. The transition marks the introduction of a set of new policies/legislation meant at the implementation of “flexibilizing” structural reforms.

The K+S model has already shown to be able to reproduce a rich set of macro and micro stylized facts (see Dosi et al., 2010, Dosi et al., 2013, and Dosi et al., 2015). Moreover, the present version, which explicitly accounts for microeconomic firms-workers interactions (cf. Figure 1), has already proved to be able to robustly reproduce most of the labour market macro empirical regularities (Dosi et al., 2016b), as presented in Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Firm-level Stylized Fact</th>
<th>Aggregate-level Stylized Fact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Skewed firm size distribution</td>
<td>Endogenous self-sustained growth with persistent fluctuations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fat-tailed firm growth rate distribution</td>
<td>Fat-tailed GDP growth rate distribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Productivity heterogeneity across firms</td>
<td>Endogenous volatility of GDP, consumption and investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persistent productivity differentials among firms</td>
<td>Cross-correlation of macro variables</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lumpy investment rates of firms</td>
<td>Pro-cyclical aggregate R&amp;D investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persistent unemployment</td>
<td>Persistent unemployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endogenous volatility of productivity, unemployment, vacancy, separation and hiring rates</td>
<td>Unemployment and inequality correlation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Beveridge curve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Okun curve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wage curve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Matching function</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Stylized facts matched by the model at different aggregation levels.

The model is simulated for 400 periods. All the results presented below refer to Monte Carlo averages of 50 simulated runs. Structural reforms are implemented at time $t = 100$, by changing all relevant model parameters from the Fordist to one of the Competitive regime scenarios, according to the values set in Table 6 in Appendix B.

The order in which the alternative regime scenarios are proposed catches a decreasing notional flexibility: from Competitive 1 to Competitive 3 firms are free to fire but find growing restrictions from the institutional rules. In all cases, however, the labour market conditions become now crucial in determining the wages requested by workers and offered by firms. Unlike the Fordist case, where both firm- and aggregate-level variables enter in the wage determination, here only individual employment status and firms vacancies do affect it, by means of a bargain-

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13We run the model for 500 periods and discard the first 100 transient periods to reduce the effects of the selected initial values of state variables in the model.
14We perform stationarity and ergodicity tests (cf. Table 8 in Appendix B) for the relevant variables (as discussed in Grazzini and Richiardi, 2015 and in Guerini and Moneta, 2016) and also check them for unimodal and reasonably symmetrical distributions which allow us to use the distributions moments as consistent estimators of the model outputs.
ing process. This implies that wages are respondent and flexible to the unemployment condition (on the supply side) and also to the firms effective labour needs (on the demand side).

Let us begin by examining the patterns for job vacancy and unemployment rates before and after the introduction of structural reforms (see Figure 2). The job vacancy (open positions) series exhibit a constant level pattern among the tested regimes, even if with different volatilities. However, the introduction of structural reforms (indicated by the vertical dotted line) at $t = 100$ determines a markedly different behaviour in unemployment, which surges from less than 1% in the Fordist regime to about 10% level in Competitive 2 and 3, reaching a level around 20% in the temporary-only contracts scenario (Competitive 1).

The dynamics of wages is presented in Figure 3. After structural reforms, the (log) trajectories gradually diverge, with the real wage in the three Competitive scenarios moving to a lower growth path. The latter phenomenon is due to the increasing functional income inequality, as the previous wage growth trend is diverted toward profits after the flexibilization of the labour market (more on that below). Why does such a functional income redistribution occur? In all the three Competitive regimes, wage growth does not completely absorb – via wage indexation – productivity growth, which is instead captured by profits.\footnote{The presence/absence of the pass-through of productivity growth to wages are usually attributed to the presence/absence of strong unions, which are not explicitly modelled here.} Note the change in the functional income distribution highlighted in Figure 4 despite the invariance of the mark-up pricing rule: the actual profit share jumps, rising almost 5 percentage points. Indeed, during the transition phase ($100 < t < 150$) the growth rate of the actual mark-up is of the same order of magnitude of the productivity growth (around 2.5 – 3%).

The structural reforms aimed at “flexibilizing” the labour market do not only impact on the functional income distribution, but also on the personal one (cf. Figures 5 and 6). The real wage dispersion and the Gini index allow to grasp from different perspectives the change in

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{unemployment_vacancy.png}
\caption{Unemployment and vacancy rates (regime transition at $t = 100$).}
\end{figure}
Figure 3: Real (log) wages dynamics (regime transition at $t = 100$).

Figure 4: Functional income inequality: average mark-up (regime transition at $t = 100$).
personal income inequality. Real wage dispersion, which takes into account only earnings from working activity (i.e. wages from employed workers), tends to be higher in Competitive 2 and 3 scenarios vis-à-vis Competitive 1, as in the latter case only temporary work contracts exist and all workers periodically enter and exit the unemployment status. In such a situation, the possibilities for wage differentiation among workers is obviously reduced but at the cost of an equalization “at the bottom”. Conversely, the Gini coefficient, which captures not only the wage dispersion but also the change in the composition between employed and unemployed workers, markedly increases in the temporary-only work contracts scenario (Competitive 1), due to the higher unemployment. Consistently with Figure 2, this reflects the higher degree of income inequality among all workers, whether employed or not.

Finally, Table 3 provides a general assessment of the dynamics of the economy under the alternative institutional configurations of the labour market. The increased flexibility in the labour market introduced by structural reforms dampens output volatility, but it considerably increases the unemployment rate and reduces the frequency of periods the economy spends in full employment. As noted above, under the different Competitive regime scenarios, both functional and personal income inequality significantly increase, as witnessed by the surge in both average mark-ups and the Gini index. In contrast to the usual claim of the economic orthodoxy and policy discourses, structural reforms do not even improve the performance of the economy in the long run. Indeed, the higher inequality resulting from the increased flexibility of the labour market reduces aggregate demand and slows down technological search positive effects, like the introduction of innovation and its diffusion rate. As a consequence, productivity and GDP growth are significantly lower in the three Competitive scenarios in comparison to the Fordist regime.
Figure 6: Personal income inequality: Gini coefficient (regime transition at $t = 100$).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth rate</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td>0.866</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.880</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.876</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.876</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volatility GDP</td>
<td>0.103</td>
<td>0.987</td>
<td>0.450</td>
<td>0.780</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.790</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.790</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Productivity</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td>0.869</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.877</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.880</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.880</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>215.8</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>102.3</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>98.06</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>98.06</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency full</td>
<td>0.557</td>
<td>0.137</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.311</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.338</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.338</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wages dispersion</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>0.552</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.508</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.486</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.486</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini coefficient</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>4.730</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>3.409</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>3.310</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>3.310</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average mark-up</td>
<td>0.316</td>
<td>1.099</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.082</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.086</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.086</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Scenario/baseline ratio and p-value for a two means test with $H_0$: no difference with baseline. Average values across 50 Monte Carlo runs.
4 Sensitivity analysis and further policy implications

Next, let us perform a global sensitivity analysis (SA)\textsuperscript{16} to explore the effects of alternative parametrization and gain further insights on the robustness of our policy exercises. Indeed, such tests allow to improve the identification of the model response to changes in the parameters, thus providing clearer and more reliable propositions in policy terms (Saltelli and Annoni, 2010).

Out of the 35 parameters of the model (cf. Table 6 in Appendix B), by means of Elementary Effect screening procedure\textsuperscript{17} we reduce the relevant parametric dimensionality to 16, by discarding from the analysis the parameters which do not significantly affect the relevant model outputs (Morris, 1991, Saltelli et al., 2008). The 16 critical parameters tested in the SA are described in Table 4, together with their “calibration” values.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(\psi^{ch_g})</td>
<td>Unemployment subsidy rate on average wage</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\alpha^{ch_g})</td>
<td>Tax rate</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\epsilon)</td>
<td>Minimum desired wage increase rate</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\omega L^{ch_g}_2)</td>
<td>Number of firms to send applications</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(T^{ch_g})</td>
<td>Number of wage memory periods</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\mu_2)</td>
<td>Initial mark-up in consumption-good sector</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\chi)</td>
<td>Replicator dynamics (intensity) coefficient</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\text{exit}_2)</td>
<td>Exit (minimum) share in consumption-good sector</td>
<td>0.00001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\dim_{mach})</td>
<td>Machine-tool unit production capacity</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>((b_a, b_i))</td>
<td>Beta distribution parameters (innovation process)</td>
<td>(3.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>([u_{u_5}, u_{u_k}])</td>
<td>Beta distribution support (innovation process)</td>
<td>([-0.15, 0.15])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(L_0^S)</td>
<td>Number of workers</td>
<td>250000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N_1)</td>
<td>Number of firms in capital-good sector</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N_2)</td>
<td>Number of firms in consumer-good sector</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Critical model parameters selected for sensitivity analysis and corresponding values. The “chg” superscript indicates parameters changed during regime transition at \(t = 100\).

In order to understand the effect of each of the 16 parameters over the selected metrics, we perform a Sobol decomposition. The Sobol decomposition is a variance-based, global SA method consisting in the decomposition of the variance of the chosen model output into fractions according to the variances of the parameters selected for analysis, better dealing with nonlinearities and non-additive interactions than traditional local SA methods. It allows to disentangle both direct and interaction quantitative effects of the parameters on the chosen metrics (Sobol, 1993, Saltelli et al., 2008). Because of the relatively high computational costs to produce the decomposition using the original model, a simplified version of it – the meta-model – was build using the Kriging method and employed for this purpose (Van Beers and Kleijnen, 2004, Rasmussen

\textsuperscript{16}For technical details on the methodology, see Dosi et al. (2016c).

\textsuperscript{17}Briefly, the Elementary Effects technique proposes both a specific design of experiments, to efficiently sample the parameter space under a one-factor-at-a-time, and some linear regression statistics, to evaluate direct and indirect effects of parameters on the model outputs.
and Williams, 2006, Salle and Yildizoglu, 2014). The meta-model is estimated from a set of observations (from the original model) carefully picked using a high-efficiency, nearly-orthogonal Latin hypercube design of experiments (Cioppa and Lucas, 2012).

We study the impact of structural reforms analysing a set of metrics, which includes the average weighted mark-up (functional income distribution), the Gini coefficient (personal income distribution), and unemployment and productivity growth rates. The results of the sensitivity analysis after the regime transition towards the Competitive 2 scenario are reported in Figures 7 and 8. This scenario was selected for presentation as the representative intermediate case – the SA of the other Competitive alternatives do not significantly differ from it. On the left hand sides are presented the Sobol decompositions for the selected metrics. Notice that the “chg” superscript indicates parameters changed during the regime transition at time $t = 100$, all the others are set from the start of simulation.

Figure 7 shows the sensitivity analysis for the average mark-up (top) and the Gini coefficient (bottom) after the regime transition towards the Competitive 2 scenario. Let us start with the functional income inequality. The Sobol decomposition (Figure 4, chart a) shows that the only relevant parameter affecting the firms’ mark-ups is the initial mark-up $\mu_2$. Thus, whenever we observe a change in the aggregate profit share, like in Figure 4, this effect is a truly emergent property of the model which derives only from the interactions of heterogeneous firms and workers. In other words, the increase in the functional income inequality verified after the introduction of structural reforms can be only attributable to the regime switch, as the initial mark-up $\mu_2$ was kept constant.

The Gini coefficient is mainly affected by the parameter $\psi_{chg}$, which determines the magnitude of unemployment benefits in terms of the aggregate average wage only after the regime change (see Figure 7, chart c). The direction of the marginal effect is illustrated on the chart (d): higher unemployment benefits (in the $y$ axis) tend to decrease personal income inequality ($z$ axis). Considering the introduction of structural reforms at $t = 100$, the Sobol decomposition indicates that about 60% of the relevant increase in the Gini coefficient between the Fordist and the Competitive scenarios can be attributed to the change in the unemployment benefit alone (driven by $\psi_{chg}$), given that the other relevant parameters affecting the Gini coefficient (like $\mu_2$ and the technology parameters) are not changed between the two regimes and are not under control of policy makers.

The results of the sensitivity analysis for the productivity growth and unemployment rates are presented in Figure 8. As expected, long-run productivity growth (charts a and b) is mainly affected by the technological parameters driving the innovation process, in particular by those related to technological opportunities (i.e., the Beta distribution shape parameter $b_{b_1}$ and its upper support limit $w_{u_6}$). At the same time, the productivity growth rate is not significantly affected by the parameters related to labour market and industry dynamics. It should be noted that this is not a “mechanical” outcome from the model design, as the actual productivity growth rates are endogenously generated and significantly affected by the aggregate income dynamics (e.g., they are mildly pro-cyclical).

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18 In summary, the Kriging meta-model “mimics” our original model by a simpler, mathematically-tractable approximation. Kriging is an interpolation method that under fairly general assumptions provides the best linear unbiased predictors for the response of complex, non-linear computer simulation models.

19 An important role is also played by innovation opportunities, captured by the $b_{b_1}$ parameter of the Beta distribution from which the productivity changes of new machines are drawn.
Figure 7: Global Sensitivity Analysis: Competitive 2 alternative scenario.

(a) Sobol decomposition: average mark-up.

(b) Average mark-up \( (y) \) vs. initial mark-up \( \mu_2 \ (x) \) (dotted lines at 95% confidence interval, red dot at calibration and markers at max./min.).

(c) Sobol decomposition: Gini coefficient.

(d) Gini coefficient \( (z) \) vs. upper Beta distribution parameter \( \beta_1 \ (x) \) and fraction of unemployment benefits \( \psi_{chg} \ (y) \) (red dot at calibration and markers at max./min.).
**Figure 8:** Global Sensitivity Analysis (continued): Competitive 2 alternative scenario.

(a) Sobol decomposition: productivity growth rate.

(b) Productivity growth rate ($z$) vs. Beta shape parameter $b_{b1}$ ($x$) and Beta distribution upper support $uu_6$ ($y$) (red dot at calibration and markers at max./min.).

(c) Sobol decomposition: unemployment rate.

(d) Unemployment rate ($z$) vs. desired wage increase $\epsilon$ ($x$) and replicator dynamics intensity $-\chi$ ($y$) (red dot at calibration and markers at max./min.).
The unemployment rate (charts c and d) is affected by several parameters related to the labour market and the industrial and technological dynamics. However, higher rates of innovation (driven by $b_{ii}$ and $u_{ii}$) can induce only modest reduction in unemployment (not shown), possibly hinting at a mild labour destroying effect of productivity growth. On the other hand, notably, the competitive selection parameter $\chi$ significantly affects the unemployment rate (cf. Figure 8, chart d), a clear sign of the labour-creating/destroying effect of Schumpeterian competition. It also suggests that pro-competitive reforms in the product market could also potentially affect labour market dynamics. Also in this line, the behavioural parameter $\epsilon$ (the minimum wage hike required by worker to switch jobs) is also an important driver for employment. $\epsilon$ explores the “eagerness” of workers when bargaining, hinting yet at the effect of (de)unionization. Chart (d) shows unambiguously that the increased negotiation power of workers, represented in the model by the exigence of higher wages, has a significant impact in reducing unemployment, in particular in situations where market selectivity and competition (controlled by parameter $\chi$) is weaker. This reinforces the importance of analysing labour market and pro-competitive reforms together, a subject of future research.\(^{20}\)

5 Conclusions

In this work, which complements and enriches the exploration started in Dosi et al. (2016b), along each history of our agent-based model we introduce regime changes capturing a series of alternative policy interventions aimed at making labour markets more flexible. Yet, such policy interventions effectively cause the increase of both functional and personal income inequality, on the one hand, and of the unemployment rate, on the other. Conversely, the model fails to provide any evidence of the existence of an equity-efficiency trade-off. On the contrary, the two dimensions are highly correlated: a larger fraction of unemployed workers (who get reduced or no unemployment benefits) simply increases the level of personal income inequality. Finally, we find robust evidence on how the degrees of job protection and the wage setting policies directly affects functional income distribution.

Therefore, are structural labour market reforms a panacea for unemployment, growth and income redistribution? According to the results provided by our model, definitely not, maybe well the opposite. Whenever the institutional structure of labour markets tends to exacerbate the asymmetry in the bargaining power between workers and firms, in favour of the latter, whenever productivity gains are not shared with workers but are retained by capitalists, or unemployment benefits are reduced or eliminated, also the macroeconomic conditions tend to get worse in terms of unemployment rates and the long-run growth of income and productivity. Indeed, it happens that the nearer the system gets to competitive conditions in the labour market, the harder it is for the Schumpeterian engine of innovation and growth to operate. More unequal income distribution and higher unemployment spells induce, via Keynesian dynamics, a stagnationist bias in the aggregate dynamics.

Building on these results, there are many ways forward. Indeed, exploring the combination of labour and product markets structural reforms, and appropriability conditions of technological discoveries (i.e., IPR regimes) is a natural continuation of the current work, quite in tune with e.g. Amable (2009) and Dosi and Stiglitz (2014). Another urgent task is to build an open

\(^{20}\)See Dosi et al., 2010 for a preliminary exploration and Amable et al., 2011 for an empirical exercise on the complementarity vis-à-vis substitutability of labour and product market regulations.
economy version of the model with interacting countries in order to analyse the distinct role of globalization in both aggregate dynamics and income distribution.

Acknowledgements

We thank Richard Freeman and Alessandro Nuvolari for useful comments and discussions. We gratefully acknowledge the support by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No. 649186 - ISIGrowth and by Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP), process No. 2015/09760-3.

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Appendices

Appendix A

Technical change, capital- and consumer-goods sectors

The technology of a capital-good firm $i$ is $(A^T_i, B^T_i)$, where the former coefficient stands for the labour productivity of the machine-tool manufactured by $i$ for the consumption-good industry (a rough measure of product quality), while the latter coefficient is the labour productivity of the production technique employed by firm $i$ itself. The superscript index $\tau$ denotes the technology vintage being produced/used. Given the monetary average wage $w_{i,t}$ paid by firm $i$ in time $t$, the unit cost of production of capital-good firms is:

$$\bar{c}_{i,t} = \frac{w_{i,t}}{B^T_i}. \quad (22)$$

With a fixed mark-up $\mu_1 \in \mathbb{R}^+$ pricing rule, prices $p_{i,t}$ are defined as:

$$p_{i,t} = (1 + \mu_1)c_{i,t}. \quad (23)$$

Firms in the capital-good industry “adaptively” strive to increase their market shares and their profits trying to improve their technology both via innovation and imitation. Both are costly processes: firms invest in R&D a fraction $n_\nu \in [0,1]$ of their past sales ($S_i$):

$$RD_{i,t} = \nu S_{i,t-1}. \quad (24)$$

R&D activity is performed by workers exclusively devoted to this activity, whose demand reads:

$$L_{R&D}^{i,t} = R_{i,t}^{RD} \quad (25)$$

which provides the real R&D expenditure for innovation. Firms split their R&D workers $L_{R&D}^{i,t}$ between innovation ($IN_{i,t}$) and imitation ($IM_{i,t}$) activities according to the parameter $\xi \in [0,1]$:

$$IN_{i,t} = \xi L_{R&D}^{i,t} \quad (26)$$

$$IM_{i,t} = (1 - \xi)L_{R&D}^{i,t}. \quad (27)$$

Innovation is a two-step process. The first one determines whether a firm obtains or not access to an innovation – irrespectively of whether it is ultimately a success or a failure – through a draw from a Bernoulli distribution, whose parameter $\theta^i_{in,t}$ is given by:

$$\theta^i_{in,t} = 1 - e^{-\zeta_1 IN_{i,t}} \quad (28)$$

with parameter $\zeta_1 \in [0,1]$. If a firm innovates, it may draw a new machine-embodies technology $(A_{i,t}^{inn}, B_{i,t}^{inn})$ according to:

$$A_{i,t}^{inn} = A_{i,t}(1 + x_{i,t}^A) \quad (29)$$

$$B_{i,t}^{inn} = B_{i,t}(1 + x_{i,t}^B) \quad (30)$$

where $x_{i,t}^A$ and $x_{i,t}^A$ are two independent draws from a Beta($b_{a_1}, b_{b_1}$) distribution, ($b_{a_1}, b_{b_1}$) $\in \mathbb{R}^2$, over the support $[u_{a5}, u_{a6}] \subset \mathbb{R}$. 

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Alike innovation search, imitation follows a two steps procedure. The possibilities of accessing imitation come from sampling a Bernoulli($\theta_{im}^{t}$):

$$\theta_{im}^{t} = 1 - e^{-\zeta_2 IM_{i,t}}$$

$\zeta_2 \in [0, 1]$. Firms accessing the second stage are able to copy the technology of one of the competitors ($A_i^{im}, B_i^{im}$). Capital-good firms select the machine to produce according to the following rule:

$$\min[p_h^{t} + bc_{A_{j,t},h}^{t}], \ h = \tau, in, im$$

where $b \in \mathbb{R}^+$ is a payback period parameter.

Firms in consumption-good sector do not conduct R&D, instead they access new technologies incorporating new machines to their existing capital stock $\Xi_{j,t}$. Therefore, firm $j$ invest according to expected demand and desired level of production. If the desired capital stock $K_{d}^{j,t}$ – computed as a function of the desired level of production $Q_{d}^{j,t}$ – is higher than the current capital stock, firms invest $EI_{d}^{j,t}$ in order to expand their production capacity:

$$EI_{d}^{j,t} = K_{d}^{j,t} - K_{j,t} - 1$$

Firms also invest $SI_{d}^{j,t}$ to replace machines by more productive vintages according to a payback period ($b$) rule, substituting machines $A_{\tau}^{i} \in \Xi_{j,t}$ according to its technology obsolescence as well as the price of new machines:

$$RS_{j,t} = \left\{ A_{\tau}^{i} \in \Xi_{j,t} : \frac{p_{i,t}^{*}}{c_{A_{\tau}^{i},j,t}^{*}} \leq b \right\}$$

where $p_{i,t}^{*} \in \mathbb{R}^+$ and $c_{j,t}^{*} \in \mathbb{R}^+$ are the price and unit cost of production upon the new machines. Given their current stock of machines $\Xi_{j,t}$, consumption-good firms compute average productivity $\pi_{j,t}$ and average unit cost of production $c_{j,t}$, based on the unit labour cost of production associated with each machine of vintage $\tau$ in its capital stock:

$$c_{j,t} = \frac{w_{j,t}}{A_{\tau}^{i}}$$

where $w_{j,t}$ is the average wage paid by firm $j$.

Consumption-good prices are set applying a variable markup $\mu_{j,t}$ on average unit costs of production:

$$p_{j,t} = (1 + \mu_{j,t})c_{j,t}$$

Mark-up variations are regulated by the evolution of firm market shares ($f_{j,t}$):

$$\mu_{j,t} = \mu_{j,t-1} \left( 1 + \frac{f_{j,t-1} - f_{j,t-2}}{f_{j,t-2}} \right)$$

with $0 < \nu < 1$. Firm market shares evolve according to a replicator dynamics:

$$f_{j,t} = f_{j,t-1} \left( 1 + \chi \frac{E_{j,t} - E_{t}}{E_{t}} \right), \ \overline{E}_{t} = \sum_{j} E_{j,t} f_{j,t-1}$$

For further details see Dosi et al. (2010).
Appendix B

Variables and parameters description

Table 5 presents the labour market-specific variables. The parameters and the simulation set-up are illustrated in Table 6 for the baseline Fordist regime. The alternative parameter values for Competitive regime scenarios 1, 2 and 3 are in Table 7. Please refer to Dosi et al. (2010) for other variables and parameters not defined here.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SYMBOL</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$L_t^D$</td>
<td>Aggregate demand for workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$L^d_{j,t}$</td>
<td>Number of demanded workers by firm $j$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$L^q_{j,t}$</td>
<td>Number of workers which queue for firm $j$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$L_{j,t}$</td>
<td>Current number of workers in firm $j$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$w_{j,t}^{max}$</td>
<td>Break-even (maximum) wage offered by firm $j$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$w_{j,t}^{o}$</td>
<td>Offered wage by firm $j$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$w_{\ell,t}^{r}$</td>
<td>Required wage by worker $\ell$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$w_{\ell,t}^{s}$</td>
<td>Satisfying wage for worker $\ell$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$w_{\ell}$</td>
<td>Effective wage (income) of worker $\ell$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$w_{t}$</td>
<td>Unemployment benefit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$w_{min}$</td>
<td>Minimum policy wage</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Labour market-specific variables.

Stationarity and ergodicity tests

Table 8 shows three alternative tests for stationarity, namely the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF), the Phillips-Perron (PP) test and Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test (KPSS). In the same table are presented two tests for ergodicity: the (multiple-pairwise) Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (KS) and the Wald-Wolfowitz test (WW). The “Avg.” columns present the average p-values for the 50 Monte Carlo simulation runs. The “Rej.” columns indicates the rate of rejection of the null hypothesis for each test among these 50 runs at 5% significance. As usual, the null hypothesis ($H_0$) for the ADF and the PP tests is that the series are non-stationary, for the KPSS, that the series are stationary, and for the KS and the WW tests, that the series are ergodic.

According to the results in Table 8, all tested variables seem to exhibit stationary behaviour in the majority of the simulation runs according to the ADF and PP tests. On the other hand, the KPSS test likely suggests that the series measured in levels, namely wage dispersion, vacancy, unemployment, Gini coefficient and average mark-up may be not (strongly) stationary. However, inspection of these variables does not seem to indicate any trend component, even because the first and the last ones (wage dispersion and average mark-up) are in practice clearly bounded while all the others are formally bounded to the range $[0, 1]$. As usual, the ergodicity tests results are somewhat less clear cut, but overall suggest that the growth variables (GDP, productivity, wage) for the majority of the simulation runs are clearly ergodic, while the variables in level are

\footnote{We report alternative tests for each property because of possible lack of power of some of them in special circumstances.}
borderline, with ergodicity being rejected in little less than 50% of the cases in average. It seems that at least a hypothesis of “weak” ergodicity may be considered here.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\psi$</td>
<td>Unemployment subsidy rate on average wage</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$alq$</td>
<td>Tax rate</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Labour market</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\epsilon$</td>
<td>Minimum desired wage increase rate</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\omega L_a$</td>
<td>Number of firms to send applications</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\omega f_{unemp}$</td>
<td>Number of firms to send applications (unemployed)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\psi_1$</td>
<td>Aggregate productivity pass-through</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\psi_2$</td>
<td>Firm-level productivity pass-through</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$T_p$</td>
<td>Number of periods before job protection</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$T_s$</td>
<td>Number of wage memory periods</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Industrial dynamics</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mu_1$</td>
<td>Mark-up in capital-good sector</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mu_2$</td>
<td>Initial mark-up in consumption-good sector</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\omega_1$</td>
<td>Competitiveness weight for price</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\omega_2$</td>
<td>Competitiveness weight for unsatisfied demand</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi$</td>
<td>Replicator dynamics (intensity) coefficient</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta$</td>
<td>expected inventories</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$v$</td>
<td>Mark-up coefficient</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$exit_2$</td>
<td>Exit (minimum) share in consumption-good sector</td>
<td>0.00001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Technology</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\nu$</td>
<td>R&amp;D investment propensity</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\xi$</td>
<td>Fraction of imitation</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\zeta_1$</td>
<td>Search capabilities for innovation</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\zeta_2$</td>
<td>Search capabilities for imitation</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$b$</td>
<td>Payback period</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$age_{max}$</td>
<td>Maximum machine-tools useful life</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$dim_{mach}$</td>
<td>Machine-tool unit production capacity</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(b_{a1}, b_{b1})$</td>
<td>Beta distribution parameters (innovation process)</td>
<td>(3, 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$[u_{u5}, u_{u6}]$</td>
<td>Beta distribution support (innovation process )</td>
<td>$[-0.15, 0.15]$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Initial conditions</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$K_0$</td>
<td>Initial capital stock in consumer-good sector</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$L_0$</td>
<td>Number of workers</td>
<td>250000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$N_1$</td>
<td>Number of firms in capital-good sector</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$N_2$</td>
<td>Number of firms in consumer-good sector</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$W_{1,0}$</td>
<td>Initial net wealth in capital-good sector</td>
<td>10000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$W_{2,0}$</td>
<td>Initial net wealth in consumption-good sector</td>
<td>10000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$w_0$</td>
<td>Initial wage (income) of all workers</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$w_{min}$</td>
<td>Initial minimum policy wage</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Simulated periods ($A$)</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transient periods ($B$)</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Effective periods ($T = A - B$)</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Monte Carlo runs ($M$)</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 6:** Model parameters and corresponding values. The labour market- and policy-specific parameters values are the baseline Fordist regime ones ($t = 0$).
Table 7: Regime-specific parameter values. Competitive values apply for all scenarios.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Fordist</th>
<th>Competitive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\omega L_a$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\psi$</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha$</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$T_s$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8: Average p-values and rate of rejection of $H_0$ at 5% significance across 50 Monte Carlo simulation runs. ADF/PP $H_0$: series non-stationary; KPSS $H_0$: series stationary; KS/AD/WW $H_0$: series ergodic.